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HENRY CASTANEDA, Petitioner v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; 
THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. 
[11 Searches and Seizures-Incidental to Arrest-Search of Prem-
ises.-Though there was reasonable cause to arrest an accused 
without a warrant, a search of his home was not justified 
as incidental to his arrest where it was at a distance from 
the place of his arrest and was not contemporaneous there-
with. 
[21 Id.-Consent.-To protect his right to object to ltn unreason-
able search or seizure, n defendant need not forcibly resist an 
officer's assertion of authority to enter his home or search it 
or his person, but if he freely consents to entry or search, or 
voluntarily produces evidence against himself, his constitu-
tional rights are not violated and any search or taking of evi-
denee pursuant to his consent is not unreasonable. 
[31 Id.-Oonsent.-Whether in a particular casc an apparcnt con-
sent to search or seizure W:lS in fnet voluntarily given or was 
in submission to an express or implied assertion of authority 
is a question of fact to be determined in the light of all the 
circumstances. 
[4] Id. - Oonsent. - Although not conclusive in determining 
whether consent to a search and srizure has been given, a 
circumstance of partic.ular significance is a defendant's cus-
tody at the time of the request for his permission to search; 
where he has submitt('d to arrest, or h; in jail, he knows thnt 
he is virtually powerless to pre,cnt the sC'arch. 
[5] Id.-Oonsent.-The prosecution failed to discharge its burden 
of showing that an accused consented to a search of his home 
where it appeared that the accused was not only under arrest 
at the time of the alleged consent, but was also handcuffed at 
all times nntil he was finally taken to jail several hours nfter 
his arrest, and had no choice but to go wherever the officers took 
him, where he knew that the officers wi:::hed to search his home 
and that if they did thpy would find evidence against llim, 
[lJ See Oal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 49; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures (ht ed § 16). 
[2J See Oal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 40; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Sl'izures (1st cd § 71). 
licK. Dig. Refel'ences: [1J Searehe!! and Seizure!!, § 29; [2-5J 
Searches and Seizures, § 22; [6J Searches and Seizures, § 1L 
) 
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and whl're he repeatedly alll·lIIph·!l til It'ad till' IIffiel'rs lIwny 
from his house, nud after such ("rorts faill'l1, Ill' wns neit.lwr 
Mkcd to nor did he exp\,('s,; his ('t)II~I'nt thut the ,;ea1'ch eon-
tinue; such effort" by the :teemed I\HIIII' it 1.'1"111' thnt he did 
lIot fl'(,l'ly nnll vohmtal'il.\· ('onO"'lIt tn the i'(':lI'eh of his home. 
[6] Id.-Search Warrants-Determination of Necessity for.-
Where a search of au aecused's hOllle was neither I~ons('uted to 
nor incident to his arrest, but WIlS at II distnnce thl'ref1'om 
and not COlltcUlP01'1l111'OUS thercwith, he had the right to have 
1\ magistrate determine whether there WitS rensouublc cause to 
search his hOl\le Itnd whcth"r a search warrant should therefore 
issue. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to prewllt the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County and III'rbert V. Wall:; (' r, Judge 
thereof, from trying petitioner 011 a criminal charge. Pel'-
emptory writ granted. 
Frank C. Wood, Jr., for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
William B. McKesson, District Attorney, Harry Wood, 
Robert J. Lord and Harry B. Sondheim, Deputy District 
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Gordon Ringer, Deputy At-
torney General, as Amici Curiae on b('half 9f RI'al Party in 
Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By information petitioner was charged 
with possession of heroin in violation of Health and Safety 
Code, section 11500. His motion to set aside the· information 
on the ground that the evidence against him was obtained by 
an illegal search and seizure was denied, and he now seek!'! 
prohibition to prevent hi!'! trial. (See Badilln v. RllPCl'iol' 
Court. 46 Ca1.2d 269, 271 [294 P.2d 23].) 
Evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing of the 
following facts: On November 21, 1961, Deputy Sheriff Cop-
ping of the narcotics detail; of the Los An~eles sheriff'R office 
and three other officers went to John Spade's hou!'!c in Lyn-
wood. They had no arrest or search warrant. Deputy Cop-
ping knew that Spade was a narcotics addh·t and llRd re-
ceived information of narcotics traffic at hiR house. Thc of-
) 
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fil'l'l'S lll'l'iwd about 7 :30 p.m. and put the house under sur-
willath·e. About 7 :45 p.m. S01l1eOne arrived in a ear, entered 
the house. fo:tayell about 15 minutes, and then drove away. 
About 8 :30 p.m. two people :1l'riYcd in a car, parked in the 
dri\'eway, tlllll l'utered the hou"e. .About 9 p.m. one of-
ficer went to the front door, another ofi1cer Wl'llt to the back 
door, and Deputy Copping allll th(' f'lurth officcl' WI'11t to the 
kitchen door at the side of tlll' honse. Through an open win-
(low, Dcputy Copping saw Spade standing in the kitchen. 
His left sleeve was rolled up, and he had an eyedropper and 
hypodermic ncedle ill his right hand. He concluded that 
Spade had just finished or was taking an injcetion of nar-
cotics. While Deputy Copping was waiting for the other of-
ficers to get set, Spade opened thc door. and Deputy Copping 
arrested him and entered the kitclll'n. Petitioner and a third 
person, Trejo, were present. From their appearance and be-
havior, Deputy Copping conl'luded that they were u110er the 
influence of narcotic8. \Yltile the other officers stayed in the 
kitchen with petitioner and Trejo, Deputy Copping took 
Spade into allother room. Sparle told him that the heroin 
had all been shot up and that he had put the narcotics outfit 
back under the sink, where the officers found it. They ar-
rested Spade, Trejo, and pf.'titioner. Deputy Copping knew 
petitioner as a person who had been named by several ad-
dicts as their source of nan:oties, and he had participated in 
the surveillance of petitioner's hou"e oyer a period of several 
months. 
The officers handcuffed pctitioner before leaving Spade's 
house, and Deputy Copping asked him if he had any more 
narcotics at his house. He said he did not. "I asked him if we 
could look, and he a8ked me if I had a search warrant. I 
stated I did not have a search warrant, and I would not need 
one if he would give me con8ent, at which time he gave me ron-
sent. Q. What did he say T A. He said you could go ahead 
and look." Deputy Copping and one of the other officers took 
petitioner with'them in their car and started toward his 
house at 305 West Bennett in Compton. Deputy Copping 
asked pctitioner where he liYed; and petitioner said that he 
lived at 1430 'l'alllal'il1cl Stt"·,,t ill Compton. He was asked i.f 
he was sure, and then said" All right. You guys know where 
I live." When they art'iwll at 305 West Bennett, petitioner 
said, "I don't live here; I live over here," and pointed to 
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him and the officers in. The officers asked petitioner's aunt if 
he lived there and she said, "No, he livrR across the way." 
Petitioner said, "1\lary, don't tell tht'lll noth ing. Mary, don't 
tell them nothing. " 
The officers took dl'felldallt from a03 to 30iJ \\\'8t BelllH'tt, 
where a young girl was sitting with petitioner's four minor 
children. She told the officers that petitioner lived there. 
They asked petitioner again if he had any narcoties in the 
house, and he said, "All right, I will tell you where they 
are." Petitioner directed the officers to his mother's house at 
1413 'l'amarind Street and told them that there were nar-
cotics on a raftcr in the garage. The officers looked and 
found nothing. They then took petitioner back to 305 West 
Bennett and seal'rlwd the house in his presence. They dis-
covered a quantity of }l('roin, which was admitted in evidence 
at the preliminary hearing oyer ohjection to establish the 
corpus delicti of the crime charged. 
[1] Although it is not disputed that the officers had rea-
sonable cause to arrest petitioner without a warrant when 
they discowred him at Spade's hous(', the search of petition-
er's home cannot be justified as incidental to his arrest, "for 
it was at a distance from the place thereof and was not con-
tempol'anevus therewith. [Citations.]" (People v. Gorg, 45 
Ca1.2d 776, 781 [271 P.2d 469] ; Tompkins v. Superior COllrt, 
ante, pp. 65, 67 [27 Cal.Rptr. 880, :378 1'.2d 113].) 
The People contend, ho'n~Yer, that the evidence is sufficient 
to support the committing magistrate's implied finding that 
petitioner freely consented to the s:'ardl or his homc. [2] In 
People v. JUcharZ, 45 Ca1.2c1 751, 753 [290 P.2d 852], we 
stated: "To protect his right to object to an unreasonable 
search or seizure a defendant need not forcibly rrsist an of-
ficer's assertion of authority to enter his home or search it or 
his person [citations], hut if he fred)' consents to an entry or 
search, or voluntarily produces evidence against himself, 
his constitutional rights are not violated and any search or 
taking of evidence pursuant to his consent is not unreason-
able. [Citations.J [3] Whether in a particular case an ap-
parent consent was in fact Yo1tmtarily given or was in submis-
sion to an express or implied a~sertioll of autllOrity, is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined in 'the light of all the circum-
stances." (See also People v. B1l1·!cc, 47 Ca1.2d 45, 49 [301 P. 
2d 241].) In the present case the testimony of Deputy Cop-
ping dispels any inference that might otherwise have been 
Apr. 1963] CA~TA:-;J,;DA 1'. RUI'ERIOR ('OlTRT 
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dl'UWlI from lwtitiolll'r's words of cOllsent that he freely and 
voluntarily cOlls('nted to the search of his home. 
[4] Although not conclusiv(', ".A circumstance of particu-
lar significance is a defendant's custody at the time of the re-
quest for llis permission to scarch, for where he has submitted 
to arrest, or is in jail, he knows that he is virtually power-
less to prevcnt the search. [Citations.]" (Peoplev. Gorg,45 
Ca1.2d 776, 782, fn. 2 [291 P.2d 469].) [5] In the present 
case, petitioner was not ouly under arrest, but he was hand-
cuffed at all times until he was finally taken to jail several 
hours aftcr his arrest, and he had no choice but to go where-
ever the officers took him. He knew that the officers wished 
to search his home and that if they did so they would find 
evidcnce against him. He repeatedly attempted to lead the 
officers away from his home, and after these efforts failed, h(' 
was neither asked to 1101' did he express his consent that tIle 
search continue. These efforta nake abundantly dear that 
petitioncr did not freely and voluntarily consent to the search 
of his home. The most that can be inferred is that petitioner 
sought to placate thc officers and hoped that by agreeing to 
the search of other premises, he would forestall the search of 
his home and the discovery of incriminating evidence. We do 
not condone petitioner's efforts to mislead the officers. [6] It 
bears emphasis, ho\vever, that petitioner was under no duty to 
assist the officers in securing evidence against him. Since the 
search was not incident to his arrest, he had the right to 
have a magistrate determine whether there was reasonable 
cause to search his home and whether a search warrant should 
therefore issue. (Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 
613-616 [81 S.Ot. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828, 831-8331; Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436, 
439-4401; AgncZlo v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 [46 
S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 148-149, 51 A.L.R. 409, 413~4141.) 
" 'Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has 
interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. 
This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a 
safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objec-
tive mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in 
order to enfodle the law. The right of privacy was deemed too 
precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the 
detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.'" (People 
v. Tarantino, 45 Ca1.2d 590, 594 [290 P.2d 505], quoting 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 [69 S.Ct. 191, 
) 
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H3 L,Rd, 153, 158],) PetitiOlH'I' did liot fOl'fl'it that righl 
hy his ('fforts to wish'all tll(' olli,:CI'S, At the pl'elilllinul'y bt'llr-
ing thl' burdcn was 011 thc JII'Ol)Celltioll to prl'Selit substantial 
(,,"jll,'uee of COII..;Cllt to the sl'arch (Badillo v. SupfI'ior COlIl't. 
·Hi Ca1.2d 26!l, 272 [294 P,2d 23]), nud it failt'd to tliSt:ilUl'gl' 
l!ia t UUI'J('U, 
r;et the pel'l'llIptory writ isslte as pl'aY(,ll. 
Gibsou, C. J., Peters,J"Tobriller, J., and Peek, J., eon-
I'I1rred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting-On tll!' facts which nrc shown 
to have becn known to the arresting otTieel's I am of tltt' vi,'\\' 
that the scarch was justified, The justifying facts appear to 
intlu{le the following items: (1) the criminal ('onLinet of the 
petitioner's companions immediately precl'ding his arr('st; 
(~) the bl'haviorof petitioner hims('1f at that time and fol-
lowing his arrest; (3) the information which the officl'l's had 
that petitioncr was an established tl'afticl,er ill illl'~al nal'-
cotics; (4) the inferences that petitioner had snpplil'd thl' drug 
which Spade had injected, and that as a regular supplier 
petitioner would have cached away a further stock of the 
{'olltraband, These are inferences which, I thinl{, officers ex-
perienced and skilled in detecting and apprehending sup-
pliers of illegal narcotics would properly have drawn from 
the above related probative facts. 
Furthermore, I think it should occur to t11e office)';; that 
this petitioner would probably have an accomplice who, 
promptly following petitioll('r '8 a1'l'('st (and disapP{,lll'allCC of 
the law enforcement officers), wonM T('lllove and secrete or 
destroy any contraband whidl mig-ht otherwise he found jn 
petitioner's home, or ill any otlll'}, p1ac(' which might be ('011-
ycniently available to him. Accordingly, such officers would 
det'm it to be only diligent discharge of duty to immediately 
pursue the clues before them, This they did, expeditiously, 
illtelligently and successfully. 
For the reasons indicated I would discharge the lllte1'uu-
th-e, and deny ~tbe peremptory, writ of prollibitioll. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CURTIS RAY 
MICKELSON, Defpllclant and Respondent. 
[la,lb] Searches and Seizures-Investigations Falling Short of 
Search.-The rule that cil'Clllllstlln('es short of probable cause 
to make an arrest Illay still justify an officrr's stopping pedes-
trians or motorists on the street for questioning does not con-
flict with U.S. Const., 4th Amend., forbidding unreasonable 
searches and seizures, but strikes a balance between a per-
son's interest in immunity from police interference and the 
community's interest in law enforcement, and wards off pres-
sure to equate reasonable cause to investigate with reasonable 
cause to arrest, thus protect.ing the innocent from the risk of 
arrest when no more than reasonable investigation is justified. 
[2] Id.-Validity of Police Procedure.-A state mle goYcl'lIill'.; 
police procedure with respect to searches and seizures is not 
unconstitutional merely because it permits conduct in which II 
federal officer may not lawfully engage. 
(3] Id.-Validity of Police Procedure.-Before a state mIl' gov-
erning police conduct with respect to searches and st·izurc~ 
may be struck down, it must appear that neither Congress 1W1' 
a state. legislature could authorize it; if a state adopts rules 
of police conduct consistent with the requirements of U.S. 
Const., 4th Amend., forbidding unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and if its officers follow those rules, they do not act 
unreasonably within the meaning of the amendment although 
different rules may govern federal officers. 
(4] Id.-Search of Vehicles-Reasonable Cause.-Although it was 
not unreasonable for a police officer to stop an automobile. 
for investigation and to take reasonable precautions for his 
own safety in view of the fact that the driver's description 
was similar to the description, previously given to the. officer, 
of the robber of 11 market, a search of the automobile which 
turned up evidence conn('cting a passenger in the vehicle 
to burgln1'i!:'s of telephonc booths exceeded the bounds of 
reasonable investigation and was not justified by probable 
[1] Sce Cal.Jur.2!t, Searches and Seizures, § 31. 
[4] Search of automobile without warrant by office.rs relying on 
description of persons suspected of 8. crime, note, 60 A.L.R. 299. 
See also Cal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 43 ; Am.Jur., Searches 
and Seizures (1st ed § 18). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 6; [2, 3] 
Searches and Seizures, § 1; [4] Searches and Seizures, § 3L 
) 
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c:luse to make an a1'I'e::;t whel'e thl'l'eCuult1 have been more 
than one pcrson abroad at night who fitted till' cll·scription of 
the market robber, where the driver, though ill the vicinity 
of the rohbery, was not obser\'ed until about .20 minutes after 
it occul'l'l'd when he was driving towarcl the SCl'ne of the crime, 
not away from it, whl'l'e the ollieer's ill\"estigntion elicited 
identification on requelSt 1111(\ a l:itoq .collsist.'nt with the auto-
mobile's movements allll the ollicel"s own assessment of those 
movements, and whel'e the OCCUIJlUlts of the car were out of the 
car and away from any weapoll::; that might have been con-
cealed therein. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County setting aside an information. Walter R. 
Evans, Judge.· Affirmed. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E, James, As-
sistant Attorllt'y General, 'ViUiam B. McKessoll, District At-
torney, Harry 'Vood and Harry Sondheim, Deputy District 
Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Gladys Towles Root, Eugene V. McPherson and Philip C. 
Greenwald for Defendant aud Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defelldant was charged in two counts of 
an information with cOlUmitting burglaries of telephone booths, 
in violation of Penal Codt', section 459. His motion to set 
aside the information was granted (Pen. Code, § 995), and 
the People appeal. The Attorney General concedes that there 
was 110 evidence at the preliminary hearing to support count I 
and seeks a reversal only as to count II. 
A Burbank police officer discovered the physical evidence 
supporting count II in the course of searching an overnight 
bag fOUlld under the front seat of an automobile in which 
defendant had bcen riding and which Don Zauzig had been 
driving. The bag contained $85,90 in nit'kels, dimes, and quar-
ters. At defen~ant's preliminary hearing, the bag and its 
contents were introduced ill evidence, and Zanzig testified 
to his and defcndant's comDlissi~n of the burglary. Zausig's 
arrest and his availability as a ,,~itness were direct results of 
the search that disclo::ed the' physical evidt'nee of the burglary. 
If that search was illrgal,neither the physical evidence nor 
Zauzig's testimony is competent to support the information. 
• Aaaiped by Chairman of Judicial CounciL 
• c.Jd-lS 
450 PEOPLE 11. MICKELSON [59 C.2d 
(SilVCl'th01'l1C Lbr. Co. v. Unitcd Stales, 2;'1 U.S. 385, 392 
l40 S.l!t. ]82, 6.J: L.Rd. 319, :.l21, 24 .A.I.J.H. l..J:26, 1428]; 
Wciss v. l.illitcd Slat.'s, 308 U.S. 321, 330-3lJ1 [60 S.Ct. 269, 
84 L.Rll. 298, 303J ; Nardollc Y. r;lIitcd States, 308 U.S. 338, 
341 [60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307, 311-312]; Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 [83 S~Ct.407,417, 9 L.Ed.2d 
441] ; People v. Bagm', 4,1 Ca1.211 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509] ; 
People v. Di:J;on, 46 Ca1.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557] ; Pcople 
v. Sehaumloffcl, 53 Cu1.2ll 96, 101-102 [346 P.2d 393]; 
People v. Ditson, 57 Ca1.2d 415, 439 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369 
P.2d 714].) 
The Attorney General contends, however, that the arresting 
officer had reasonable cause to arrest Zauzig for a rce~llt rob-
bery in the neighborhood and that the search of the car was 
therefore justified as incidental to the arrest. Before thc d,'-
cision of the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081], ''"'' 
,vere free to determine such an issue under the Califol'llia 
decisi9ns setting forth the rules governing police inwstiga-
tions and arrests. In view of the holding in that case that the 
Fonrteenth Amendment requires state courts to exelude un-
constitutionally obtained evidence, we must determine at the 
outset whether the federal rules governing police invcf,tiga-
tions and arrests have superseded our own. rrht'l'l! are 
significant differences bet,veen the respective rules that are 
relevant to this case. 
In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 [80 S.Ct. 168, 
4 L.Ed.2d 134, 139], the United States Supreme Court held 
that an arrest occurs when an automobile is stopped during 
the course of a criminal investigation, and if the officer docs 
not have reasonable cause to arrest the occupant at that time, 
the arrest is unlawful. Anything the officer learns as a result 
of stopping the automobile is inadmissible in eyidence and 
cannot justify a search. (See also Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 166 [69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Eel. 1879, 1885]; Rios 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-262 [80 S.Ct. 143], 4 
L.Ed.2d 1688, 1693"1694].) [1a] In this state, however, 
we have eonsistently held that circumstances short of prob-
able cause to make an arrest ~ay still justify an officer's 
stopping pedestrians or motorists on the streets for question-
ing. If the circumstances warrant it, he may in self-protection 
request a suspect to alight from an automobile or to submit 
to a superficial search for concealed weapons. Should the 
I investigation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, the 
) 
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officer may alTest the susped and cOIlJnd a reasonable inci-
dental search. (l'coplc v. Simon, 4.) Ca1.2J 645, 650 [290 
P.2d 531] ; People v. Martin, 46 Cal.:!ll 106, 108 [293 P.2d 
52] ; People v. Blodgctt, 4G ('a1.2<1 114, 117 [293 P.2d 57] ; 
Pcople v. BetICrly, 200 Ca1..\pp.:2d 119, 125 [19 CaJ.Rptr. 
67]; People v. King, 17;) Cal.App.2d 386, 390 [346 P.2d 
235] ; People ", .1l1l1s/tct'itz, ]83 Ca1.App.2d 752, 755 [6 Cal. 
Rptr.78;)].) 
The Mapp case did not determine whether or not the states 
must follow all the federal rules. :Neither did Elkins v. 
United States, 364 V.S. 206 [80 S.Ct. 1437, 1453, 4 L.Ed.2d 
1669], which Oil this mutter held only that the con dud of 
state offieers would be lllcilsmed a~aillst the federal rules 
when state-secured evidence was offered in federal prose-
cutions. 
[2] A state rule governing police procedure is not uncon-
stitutional merely because it pl'l'mits conduct in which a fed-
eral officer may not lawfully engage. The Fourth Amend-
ment! itself sets forth 110 more than the basic outlines of 
lawful law enforcement. It bccomes mcaningful in specific 
situations only by reference to the common law and statutory 
law governing the issuance of warrants, the authority of 
officers, and the power to arrest. Illegally obtained evidence 
may be excluded by the federal courts for various reasons. 
It may be excluded because it was obtained in a way that 
could not constitutionally be authorizcd. It may be excluded 
because it was obtained in violation of a federal statute or 
a common-law rule or a state rule applicable to federal 
officers. It may be exclnded by yjrtue of the Supreme Court's 
monitorship of the federal administration of criminal justic('. 
(Fed. R. Crim. Proc., 3, 4,26,41; 18 U.S.C. App., pp. 3407-
3452 (1958).) 
The United States Supreme Court has not interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment as requiring that court to day down as a 
matter of constitutional lmv pre('is'2 rules of police conduct. 
Indeed, its rule allowing a srarch by a federal officer without 
a warrant as incident to a lawful arrest permits reference to 
state law to detl'rmine the validity of the arrest. (Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. I?, 15 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436, 
'''The right of H,c people to I)c sl'cure ill their pcrsons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against un ",~a~onal ,Ie SCarl'hCR and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly dcscribing the place to be 
8earched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
) 
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·H1] ; United State.~ v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 [68 s.n. 222, 
92 L.Ed. 210, 217].) [3] Accordingly, bcfol'e a state rule 
governing police conduct lIlay be struck down, it must IlPlwar 
that neither Congress nor a state legislature could authori:~,' 
it. If a state adopts rules of police conduct cOllsistent with 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and if its officers 
follow those rules, they 00 not act unreasonably within the 
meaning of the amendmrut although different rules llIay 
govern fcderal officers. 
[1 b] We do not believe that our rule permitting temporary 
detention for questiouing conflicts with the Fourth Amend-
ment. It strikes a balance between a person's iuterest in im-
muuity from police iuterference and the commuuity's interest 
in law enforcement. It wards off pressure to equate reallon-
able cause to investigate with reasonable cause to arrest, t}ms 
protecting the inlloccnt from the risk of arrrst whrll no mor!' 
than reasonable investigation is justified. (See Barrett, Prr-
sonal Rights, Pl'opm·ty Rights, alld The Fou.rth A.mendment, 
1960 Sup.Ct. Rev. 46,65-66,69-70.) 
The United Statl's Supreme Court apparently concluded that 
the situations presented in the Henry, Rios, and Brinegar 
cases allowed no middle ground (see dissenting opinion of 
Jackson, J. in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 
[69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1894]), and hence that the 
officers were not justified in stopping the defendants' auto-
mobiles unless they had probable cause to make arrests. It 
does not follow that its cOllclul'lioll was constitutionally com-
pelled. Given the absence of legislation, the court had to 
articulate the governing rule and enforce compliance with it. 
It did not thereby foreclose Congress or the states from artic-
ulating other reasonable rules consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
[ 4] It remains to determine whether the srarch in this case 
complied with the rules of this state. The arresting officer 
testified that he arrested defendant aud Zauzig shortly before 
2 a.m. about 20 minutes after he had gOlle to a market on 
San Fernando Road where a robbery had just bcen reported. 
He was told by other officers at the market that the robber 
was a fairly tall white man of large build with dark hair 
who was wearing~a red sweater and armed with a .45 auto-
matic. The officer searched the area on foot for about 10 
minutes and then rl'turned to his car to scareh a wider area. 
While driving west on Providellcia about six blocks from the 
market he saw a station wagon coming toward him with two 
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JH'l':;OIlS ill it. Till' driWL" aPI"'a\'l'd to be a larg" white man 
with dat'k hait' wl'ariug' a "I't! SWl'utel' 01' jaekd, The officer 
saw thc :;tatiou wagon tUl'll sonth 011 San Fernando toward 
the IIHIl'ket, and hc tlll'l1etl south into an alley and then west 
at the next stl'l'l't, Ill' then saw the station wagon turn west 
f,'om San l·'et'lIlllldo on the sallie street and followed it, The 
station WUgOll wellt to the cud of the street wll('re it came 
to 11 lh'adend, 1llaue a U-t 111'11, aud proceeded back toward 
San Fernando, 'rIte officer ci,'c1cd a block to his right and 
tut'llt'll sonth 011 San PCt'11l1lldo, He was then a blod;: or two 
hehind the station wugon, wllith was traveling :;outl1 011 San 
:;!'el'il:lntlo at about 25 or :30 miles pel' hour, The offil.:('l' oyer-
took the station wagon alld obsl'l'Ved the rassl'llger "bend 
;'0I'\\,:1r(} in the s,'at, fOi'\\'l\l'(l and dow'n and rais::! back up," 
He tumed on his red light, the station wagon pulled over 
:L1111 stopped, alllI tlle oftil.'er pm'ked behind it, lIe radioed 
his location to ht'nllquat'tl'I's nnd l'e1luested a bnelmp car for 
a!o;sist/mce, Meanwhile Zilll7ig got out of the dl'ivt:'r's seat of 
the station wugoll and walkt>d to the officer's ear, The officer 
asl,ed Zauzig wlll'l'l! he was going', aud Zanzig' told him he 
was going hOIll(' to UIC'ndale, that he was lUore or less lost, 
and had heen driying up aull down sidestrt'ets looking for the 
fl'eeway, He :,:howed the officer his driY!:'r's license, The 
assisting officpl'S al'l'iv('u, alltl the officf'l's and Zauzig walked 
to the station wagon, Defentlallt was sittillg' in the right front 
seat and got out 011 request, The arresting officer looked 
under the right fl'~lllt seat and on the floorboards and saw an 
overnight bag stuffed undl'r the right front seat, He pulled 
it out, unzipped it, alld saw foul' sCi'cwdrh'ers, a flashlight, a 
pair of canvas glovl'3 and two socks, Olle Hock was knotted 
at the top and was filled with something that jingled, \Vhen 
he took the hag out of the car, the officer asked Zauzig wllat 
it was, aud Zallzig told him that it was his basl,etball equip-
ment, The officer u"ked what was in thc sock, and Zauzig 
told him that he llad some dimes, The officer opened the 
sock and found llickds. dimes, and quarters, He arrested 
Zauzig and dl,f0lHlant Oil suspicion of burglary, The officer 
also testified that thl'l'e was lIothing in his conversation with 
Zauzig that \\'ould it'llicate that he had p<:'l'pet1'ated a robbery 
other than that he adcd II hit fl'it'IHlIy, The lllevelllents of 
the car were sudl that. it was plJvious that the oeeupants were 
either tryillg to ('vade tlw officer or were confused and did 
1I0t know the art'a VC\'Y wl'11. His purpose in examining the 
bag was the "possibility of a gun being there." After he 
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had talked to Zau;..ig aad (It'l'l111Iant he was satisfied that they 
ha(lllot bel'l} involved ill till' i'ohbel'Y. 
It "as not ul\l"easollaille for tli(' of!1el'l' to stop Zauzig's car 
for illwlStigatiou and to takc reasonable precautions for his 
own safety. He did not have prohablc canSt', however, to 
arrest Zauzig for robbery. There could have been 1I\0re than 
one' tail white lllall with dark hairwNll'ing' a red sweater 
abroad at llig-ht .ill such a llIl'tropolitanat·ea. .Although Zau-
zig was ill the viciuity of the robhery, he was 110t ob:;en'ed 
until ~tbout 20 lllinut('s after it on'Ill'l'nl wlH'1l hI' was driving 
toward the ::;celle of the crime, not away from it. The officer 
had 110 informution that the robber hat! an automobile or a 
confedcrlltc. 'fhe Nratic route of the car und defendant's 
mOYl'lllcllt ill the scat were at 1110st suspicion;; eireumstances. 
The officer's iuvc!>tigatiollrlieited id('ntifieation upon reqnest 
and a story consistent 'with the movements of the car and 
the officer's own assessment of those movements. Both occu-
pauts were out of the car away from any weapons tllat might 
haYe heen concealcd therein. Instead of interrogating Zau-
7.ig and defendant with respect to the robbery or rcquestil\~ 
them to aecompany the officers the few blocks to the market 
for possible identification, the officer elected to rummnge 
through closed baggage found in the car in the hope of turn-
ing up evidence that might connect Zauzig with the robbery. 
'fliat search exceeded the bounds of reasonnble investigation. 
It was not justified by probable cause to make an arrest, and 
it cannot be justified by what it turned up. (People v. Brown, 
45 Ca1.2d 640, 643-644 [290P.2d 528].) 
The ordl'r is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Tobriner, J., and PeE'k, J., con-
curred. 
PETERS, J.-I concur. 
I agree that the seareh hl'1'e involved was illegal, both under 
state and federal law. Therefore, I agree that the order 
appealed from must be affirmed. But, in my opinioll, such 
holding makes it unnCCl'ssary to discuss the scope and impact 
on state law of the decision of lrlapp v. Ohio, 367 F.8. 643 
[81 S.Ct. 1684,.6 L.Ed.2d 1081]. In my opinion the deter-
mination of that important cOIl'ititutional qu('stion should be 
left to a case where it is directly involved. 
McCOMB, J.-I disscnt. I would l'cV('l'se the order of the 
trial court as to count II and afl1rlll the order as to count I, 
) 
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for the l"l'a;sons expressed by Mr. Presiuillf! Justicc Fox in the 
opillion pl"l'pared by him '::or the District Court of .Appeal 
in J>COl)lc v. Mickelson (Cal.App.) 26 Cal.Rptr. 152. 
Appellant's petition for a rL'llcaring \"as ueni,'u l\Iay 14, 
1963. McComb, J., was of thc opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
